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CRIMINA.L PROCEDURE--EFFECT OF A DEFECTIVE
WARRANT ON A HOMICIDE COMIMITTED IN THE'
COURSE OF ITS EXECUTION
There are several elements of arrest which control the
lawfulness of the act: (1) The officer may use no more force
than is reasonably necessary; (2) the person arrested must
know that he is confronted by an officer; and (3) except
under certain conditions the officer must have a warrant. For
the purpose of this discussion only one element will be con-
sidered. In the execution of a defective warrant, what is the
effect of the instrument on a resulting homicide? To properly
weigh the effect of a defective process it is essential that the
arrest would be illegal without a warrant. It is necessary to
assume further that all other elements of legality are satisfied.
The problem to be discussed may arise in either of two
general situations: first, the officer commits a homicide in
effecting the arrest on a defective warrant; second, the officer
is killed by one resisting the arrest on a defective warrant.
I. liO-MICIDE IN EFFECTING AN ARREST ON A DEPECTIVE
WARYmUT
An officer may be justified in killing in the course of a
legal arrest if it is necessary to save his own life, or in some
instances if the arrest cannot otherwise be effected.' If the
officer is attempting an unlawful arrest the justification is
removed and the killing will be felonious.2 But suppose he
relies on a defective warrant? Is the homicide still justifiable?
The defect may be patent or latent.
A. Patent Defect
If the warrant is executed outside the jurisdiction of the
issuing magistrate it becomes a nullity. The law will afford
the officer no protection in such a case.3  Even if he is re-
IState v. Smith, 127 Iowa 534, 103 N. W. 944 (1905); Fitzpatrick
v. Commonwealth, 210 Ky. 385, 275 S. W. 819 (1925); State v. Ford,
344 Mo. 1219, 130 S. W. (2d) 635 (1939).
'Roberson v. State, 53 Ark. 515, 14 S. W. 902 (1890); Carter v.
State, 30 Tex. App. 55, 17 S. W. 1102 (1891).
'Peter v. State, 23 Tex. App. 684, 5 S. W. 228 (1887).
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sisted with such force that his life is endangered and kills out
of necessity to protect it, he will not be allowed to plead self
defense.4
Lack of jurisdiction of the issuing magistrate seems to be
the only defect that is necessarily fatal to the officer's right of
self defense. But if there is no lack of jurisdiction and the
officer relies on a warrant and a homicide results the courts
will not permit the fact that the warrant is defective to deprive
hinm of his right to self defense.5 The fact that the defect
appears on the face of the warrant does not seem to be material
here. 6 The courts show a strong tendency to protect the ar-
resting officer as long as his acts can be given color of authority.
7
B. Latent Defect
The precise question that arises here is: How is a homi-
cide committed by an officer while executing a warrant valid
on its face but with a latent defect, affected by such a defect?
This apparently has not been considered by the courts. How-
ever, if he is protected by a warrant defective oil its face, '
a fortiori he should be protected by one that appears to be
valid.
II. HoMICIDE IN RES:STING ARREST ON A DEFECTIvE VArRIANT
A. Patent Defect
It has been shown that an officer who commits a homicide
in effectin- an arrest may be protected although he is acting
under a defective warrant.9 Now reverse the circumstances
and suppose the officer is killed by the person who is being
arrested. How will the fact that the warrant is defective affect
the crime of the person who kills the officer in resisting the
arrest? In such a case the defect, if apparent on the face of
the warrant, is given greater consideration than where the
officer kills the person sought to be arrested, a situation which
has been discussed above. In this case the officer is considered
4 Ibid.
I State v. Gupton, 166 N. C. 257, 80 S. E. 989 (1914).
'Neeley v. Commonwealth, 123 Ky. 1, 93 S. W. 596 (1906); State
v. Gupton, n. 5, supra.
Neeley v. Commonwealth, n. 5, supra.
See the cases in n. 5, supra.
"N. 5, supra.
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to be acting without authority. 0 The illegal attempt upon the
person of the one sought to be arrested is sufficient provocation
to reduce the crime from murder to manslaughter." The ef-
fect of this attitude is that an arrest on a defective warrant is
an illegal arrest and one who kills in resisting such an arrest
is entitled to have the offense reduced to manslaughter.
12
There is some contra opinion to this view. This contra
view was introduced as dictim by Coke in Mackalley's Case'3
and has been followed in some jurisdictions.' 4 Other juris-
dictions have modified the rule of mitigation occasioned by a
defective warrant but have not repudiated it.15 Under this
modified rule the defect will not reduce the offense from mur-
der to manslaughter where the killer did not know of the
illegality of the warrant."'
B. Latent Defect
Some jurisdictions make no distinction between patent and
latent defects in considering the liability of a person who kills
an arresting officer in resisting arrest. Such jurisdictions
apply the rule literally that a homicide committed in resisting
an illegal arrest cannot be more than manslaughter in the
absence of express malice. These jurisdictions would reach this
result even when the arrest is on a warrant appearing to be
valid on its face. 17 A court following this view will therefore
hold a latent defect in the warrant, for example, where the
"Noles v. The State, 24 Ala. 672 (1854); Tackett v. State, 11
Tenn. (3 Yerg.) 392 (1832).
"Ibid.
"Palmer v. People, 138 Ill. 356, 28 N. E. 130 (1891).
See Mackalley's Case, 9 Coke 65, 68b, 77 Eng. Rep. 828, 834
(1611).
"Boyd v. The State, 17 Ga. 194 (1855) (citing Mackalley's
Case); Alsop v. Commonwealth, 4 Ky. L.R. 547 (1882).
' Reg. v. Allen and others, 17 Law Times (N. S.) 222 (1867).
' Ibid. The tendency of the courts to protect an officer acting
under a warrant more than one acting without a warrant, even
though the warrant is defective on its face, may be noted here. In
the same jurisdiction a homicide committed in resisting illegal arrest
without a warrant was held to be manslaughter only, even though
the defendant did not know of the illegality at the time the killing
occurred, Rex v. William Thompson, 1 Moody C. C., 168 Eng. Rep.
1193 (1825), but in Re-. v. Allen and others, 17 Law Times (N.S.) 222
(1867), it was held the offense could not be reduced because the
person resisting arrest did not know of the defect in the warrant.
"Rafferty v. People, 69 Ill. 111 (1873).
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warrant was signed in blank by a magistrate and later issued
by a policeman, to be sufficient to mitigate a homicide from
murder to manslaughter.' 8  The fact that the person being
arrested knew nothing of the improper issuance at the time he
killed the officer will not defeat his attack on the legality of
the warrant and his offense will nevertheless be reduced to
manslaughter."
This view is not generally accepted. The majority of the
courts refuse to allow a latent defect in the warrant to mitigate
the crime from murder to manslaughter.-" If the warrant
appears to be fair on its face and the person sought to be ar-
rested kills the officer he is guilty of murder.-" This result
is not affected by the officer's knowledge of facts which would
invalidate the warrant,22 for the courts have not seen fit to
compel the officer to judge the validity of the warrant by facts
within his knowledge as long as it appears to be regular on
its face.
23
Siummary. The decided tendency of the courts, when
dealing with a homicide growing out of arrest on a defective
warrant, seems to be to protect the officer who is clothed with
the color of authority. This is probably the proper attitude
where the defect is latent. Even where the officer knows facts
which would, as a matter of law, render the warrant void, it
may be unfair to require him to judge the acts of the magis-
trate. It might also be argued that holding the officer to, or
permitting him to exercise that degree of discretion, would
reach undesirable social results in that it could render the
authority of the magistrate ineffectual.
But no such argument can be given for protecting him
where the warrant is void on its face. There is no reason why
one entrusted with the enforcement of the law should not know,
at his peril, that the process he executes is not valid when the
defect is patent. Why should an officer who kills in an attempt
Ibid.
9 Ibid.
Boyd v. The State, 17 Ga. 194 (1855); Bullock v. State, 65 N.3.L.
557, 47 Atl. 62 (1900); J1. H. Rainey v. The State, 20 Tex. App. 455
(1886).
, Ibid.
'Bullock v. State, 65 N.J.L. 557, 47 Atl. 62 (1900).
" J. H. Rainey v. The State, 20 Tex. App. 455 (1886).
76
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to execute such a defective warrant be in any better position
than any other aggressor who kills while attempting an illegal
assault
It has been found that in the majority of jurisdictions
where the officer is killed by the person who is being arrested,
the homicide is reduced to manslaughter if the defect is patent,
while it is not reduced if the defect is latent. This distinction
does not appear to be supported by reason. It is difficult to
understand how blood and passion could be aroused by a war-
rant void on its face but not seen by the defendant any more
than by a warrant which had no such defect.
The proper degree of the crime would be more certain of
determination if the defective warrant were not permitted to
control the case. Under the present rule, the offense may be
reduced from murder to manslaughter in instances where the
person who was being arrested could have had no heat and
passion in fact, since he did not know the warrant was de-
fective. It would seem better if an arrest on a defective warrant
would be sufficient provocation to reduce from murder to man-
slaughter only if heat and passion were actually aroused by
the illegality.
FRED B. REDWiNE
